Copyright 2019 by Jordan Blair Woods
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 114

AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICE DEESCALATION
Jordan Blair Woods
ABSTRACT—Several experts predict that autonomous vehicles will
become mainstream in the next few decades. Although autonomous vehicles
will have massive implications for law enforcement, the technology has
received little to no attention in criminal procedure and policing scholarship.
This Essay introduces a new vector into the nascent law and policy discourse
on autonomous vehicles and policing—de-escalation and officer safety.
Although largely overlooked in this discourse, officer safety is a crucial topic
given its powerful role in shaping officer training, departmental policies, and
Fourth Amendment law.
This Essay argues that autonomous vehicles and their included
technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time high definition
(HD) mapping, and network connectivity systems) have promise to decrease
possibilities for escalation during vehicle stops in at least five ways:
(1) vehicles will be programmed to follow traffic rules, making traffic stops
much less common; (2) sensory technology will prevent vehicles from
hitting other vehicles or persons, decreasing motor vehicle assaults against
officers; (3) driver’s license requirements could be eliminated, taking the
enforcement of driver’s license laws out of the hands of police; (4) DUI law
reforms could abolish the need for officers to conduct DUI stops,
investigations, or arrests; and (5) sensory technology in vehicles will reduce
investigations associated with hit-and-run offenses, and will simplify
accident investigations overall. This Essay explores how these potential
changes have vast implications for Fourth Amendment law, officer training,
and law enforcement policy on motor vehicle stops.
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INTRODUCTION
Driving on roads and highways could soon look radically different.
Several automotive manufacturers and high-tech companies are investing
billions of dollars to develop autonomous vehicles (also called self-driving
cars) for the marketplace.1 Over thirty states have recently enacted
legislation, and more states are introducing bills, related to autonomous
vehicles.2 Experts predict that autonomous vehicles will become mainstream

1

See Danielle Muoio, 19 Companies Racing to Put Self-Driving Cars on the Road by 2021, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-making-driverless-carsby-2020-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/3QRJ-XX93].
2
See Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/KBD8-N6UY].
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in the next few decades and potentially fully replace human-controlled
vehicles.3
As the self-driving car revolution gains speed, tort scholars and
policymakers are turning their attention to how the new technology will
transform traffic liability rules and motor vehicle regulations.4 Much less
attention, however, is being paid to autonomous vehicles and policing. There
is little to no discussion of autonomous vehicles in existing criminal
procedure and policing scholarship.5 Most law enforcement agencies are not
seriously considering or preparing for the new technology,6 and the few
police chiefs and sheriffs that have considered the issue are largely claiming
that law enforcement is being left out of major strategic and policy
discussions on autonomous vehicles.7
All signs indicate, however, that autonomous vehicles will have
massive implications for law enforcement. Traffic stops, accident
investigations, and motor vehicle stops on criminal suspects are major
components of police work today.8 Currently, traffic stops are the most
common way that civilians come into contact with the police.9 In the nascent
discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing, some police chiefs and
sheriffs are warning that the new technology will largely undermine crime
3
Kevin Davis, Preparing for a Future with Autonomous Vehicles, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (July 2016),
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/preparing-for-a-future-with-autonomous-vehicles
[https://perma.cc/LZ7C-78H7]; Ed Sappin, Will Self-Driving Cars End the Big Automakers?, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnycouncil/2018/04/13/will-self-drivingcars-end-the-big-automakers/#7d4baa85356d [https://perma.cc/MYM9-USHL].
4
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 129 (2019)
(arguing that autonomous vehicles will necessitate updating manufacturer liability rules); Mark A.
Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal
Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611 (2017) (exploring federalism and duty of care questions
posed by autonomous vehicles); Tracy Hresko Pearl, Hands on the Wheel: A Call for Greater Regulation
of Semi-Autonomous Cars, 93 IND. L.J. 713, 716 (2018) (arguing that the risks of autonomous vehicles
in general, and semi-autonomous vehicles in particular, necessitate greater federal regulation).
5
See infra Part I; Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Seizures: Police Stops of Self-Driving Cars, N.Y.U.
L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) [hereinafter Joh, Automated Seizures].
6
See Robin Washington, Driverless Cars Are Coming. What Does That Mean for Policing?,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Sept.
29,
2016,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/29/driverless-cars-are-coming-what-does-that-mean-forpolicing [https://perma.cc/L7G7-V8MA].
7
See, e.g., Pete Bigelow, On the Path to Autonomous Vehicles, Police Officers Get Left Behind, CAR
& DRIVER (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/on-the-path-to-autonomous-vehiclespolice-officers-get-left-behind [https://perma.cc/4HH6-2EFL] (noting that not one member of the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s advisory committee on autonomous vehicles has a law enforcement
background).
8
GARY W. CORDNER, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 28 (Routledge 9th ed. 2016) (1979).
9
ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC,
2015 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLQ-65NF].

76

114:74 (2019)

Autonomous Vehicles and Police De-escalation

detection and criminal investigations by eliminating pretextual traffic stops,10
a strategy they consider to be a major crime-fighting tool.11 At the same time,
curbing traffic stops (especially pretextual ones) could have significant
benefits for members of minority communities, who are disproportionately
targeted and harmed by these practices.12
This Essay introduces an important, yet missing, vector in the
developing scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles—deescalation and officer safety. To the extent that safety concerns are a focus
in the current discourse, the emphasis is primarily on drivers and pedestrians,
not officers.13 This Essay explores how autonomous vehicles and their
included technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time HD
mapping, and network connectivity systems) have promise to transform
officers’ interactions with automobiles in ways that reduce the possibility of
escalation during motor vehicle stops. Society should embrace these
potential changes because escalation during automobile encounters
undermines both officer and civilian safety.
This Essay contends that autonomous vehicles and their included
technologies can decrease the possibility of escalation during motor vehicle
stops in at least five ways: (1) vehicles will be programmed to follow traffic
rules, making traffic stops much less common; (2) sensory technology will
prevent vehicles from hitting other vehicles or persons, decreasing motor
vehicle assaults against officers; (3) driver’s license requirements could be
eliminated, taking the enforcement of driver’s license laws out of the hands
of police; (4) DUI law reforms could abolish the need for officers to conduct
DUI stops, investigations, or arrests; and (5) sensory technology in vehicles
will reduce investigations associated with hit-and-run offenses, and will
simplify accident investigations overall.14
In bringing de-escalation and officer safety to the discussion on
autonomous vehicles and policing, this Essay makes two significant
contributions. First, it pushes against a growing critique among law
enforcement leaders that autonomous vehicles are only bad for the police
10
See Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 199, 209 (2007) [hereinafter Joh, Discretionless Policing] (defining pretextual stops as
“occasions when the justification offered for the detention is legally sufficient, but is not the actual reason
for the stop”).
11
See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 156 (2017) (noting that a newspaper
published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police stated that using traffic stops to detect
criminal activity is “our most effective tool for interdicting criminals”).
12
See infra Part I.B.
13
See infra Part I.A.
14
See infra Part II.
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because the technology will eliminate pretextual traffic stops, which officers
currently rely on as a crime-fighting tool.15 This critique misses a critical
component of the cost-benefit analysis on autonomous vehicles and
policing—namely, officer safety. Second, this Essay shows that the potential
safety benefits from autonomous vehicles offer a new platform to improve
public perceptions of safety in officer training, departmental policies, and
Fourth Amendment law on motor vehicle stops.16
Two caveats are in order. First, given that scholars and policymakers
are just beginning to explore the topic, I recognize that there are many open
questions about how autonomous vehicles will affect policing. Thus, the
scope of this Essay is narrow. Its purpose is to expose the potential benefits
of autonomous vehicles that stem from reducing possibilities for police
escalation and the implications of this reduction for officer training and
policing laws and policies.17
Second, it is important to recognize that the current technology
surrounding autonomous vehicles is far from perfect.18 Some experts argue
that it may take years or even decades to overcome current testing and

15

See infra Part I.B.
See Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 635, 637–39 (2019) [hereinafter Woods, Traffic Stops] (noting that “[t]he narrative that routine
traffic stops are fraught with danger to the police is longstanding”). In order to stress the dangers of being
complacent on the scene and hesitating to use force, police academies regularly show officer trainees
video clips of officers being randomly shot during traffic stops that otherwise appear entirely routine.
Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1397–98 & nn.139–44 (2018)
(discussing the popularity among police officers of videos depicting violence against police officers and
collecting sources). Courts, including the U.S Supreme Court, consistently assume that routine traffic
stops pose grave dangers to the police. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (quoting
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983)) (“[T]he Court has recognized that traffic stops are
‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414
(1997) (discussing the danger posed to police officers by passengers of stopped vehicles). Autonomous
vehicles may help to make clearer what is already true, but widely underappreciated—traffic stops are
not as perilous for officers as the currently dominant danger narrative suggests. See Woods, Traffic Stops,
supra note 16, at 640.
17
These contributions to the scholarly conversation are necessary due to the significance of officer
safety in shaping officer training, departmental policies, and Fourth Amendment law. See Woods, Traffic
Stops, supra note 16, at 637–39 (discussing how danger narratives shape Fourth Amendment law on
traffic stops); see generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1995, 2068 (2017) (discussing courts’ deference to police expertise); Alice Ristroph, The
Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1205–07 (2017) (discussing how courts defer
to concerns about officer safety).
18
See Peter Hancock, Are Autonomous Cars Really Safer Than Human Drivers?, CONVERSATION
(Feb. 2, 2018, 6:29 AM), https://theconversation.com/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-than-humandrivers-90202 [https://perma.cc/9AJ9-EDWE] (discussing the dangers posed by autonomous vehicles).
See generally HARVEY ROSENFIELD, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES: THE THREAT
TO CONSUMERS (2017), https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/sites/default/files/resources/self_driving_
consumer_threat_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4MY-ECQY] (discussing criticisms of self-driving cars).
16
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validation obstacles for autonomous vehicles to become commonplace.19
This Essay assumes for the sake of argument that the technology will
continue to rapidly advance as investment continues20 and will move beyond
these testing and validation obstacles in the long run.
Even if it takes decades until autonomous vehicles reach their prime, it
is important in the current moment to think about how the technology can
facilitate de-escalation during police encounters. Law enforcement leaders
have expressed concerns that law enforcement is being left out of the current
policy and strategy discussions on autonomous vehicles.21 For instance, in
January 2017 the U.S. Department of Transportation created a twenty-five
person advisory committee to focus on automated transportation.22 Not a
single person appointed to the committee was affiliated with law
enforcement.23
Thus, now is the time for researchers, industry players, and institutional
actors that regulate the police (for instance, legislatures, policymakers, and
law enforcement leaders) to start seriously considering these issues before
the technology is developed and the moment has passed. Neglecting how
autonomous vehicles relate to police work can potentially inhibit developing
the technology in ways that mutually benefit officers and civilians during
police encounters and motor vehicle stops in particular.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by describing major
themes in the early scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles
and policing. Part II discusses five ways that autonomous vehicles and their
included technologies have promise to reduce escalation during motor
vehicle stops in ways that benefit officer as well as civilian safety. Finally,
Part III discusses the broader implications of this de-escalation potential on
Fourth Amendment doctrine, officer training, and departmental policies
involving motor vehicle stops.

19
See generally Philip Koopman & Michael Wagner, Challenges in Autonomous Vehicle Testing
and Validation, 4 SAE INT’L J. TRANSP. SAFETY 15 (2016) (laying out the validation challenges that must
be overcome to ensure the safety of autonomous vehicles); see also Aarian Marshall, After Peak Hype,
Self-Driving Cars Enter the Trough of Disillusionment, WIRED (Dec. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-challenges [https://perma.cc/6WDQ-DU6M] (discussing
when autonomous vehicles may become commonplace).
20
See Muoio, supra note 1 (demonstrating that multiple car manufacturers and technology
companies are devoting substantial capital to developing autonomous vehicles).
21
See Bigelow, supra note 7.
22
Advisory Committee on Automation in Transportation (ACAT), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Apr. 13,
2017), https://www.transportation.gov/acat [https://perma.cc/B8TL-LN32].
23
ACAT
Member
Profiles,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
TRANSP.
(Jan.
11,
2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/acat/members [https://perma.cc/T953-5RQ5] (listing members and
affiliations of the advisory committee).
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I.

AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICING

This Part outlines major themes in the early scholarly and policy
discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing. Importantly, the topic of deescalation and officer safety is missing from these early discussions.
A. Traffic Safety
There is growing agreement among scholars and policymakers that
autonomous vehicles will considerably improve traffic safety.24 Autonomous
vehicles will be programmed to comply with traffic laws, and built-in sensors
are expected to prevent collisions with other vehicles or people.25 According
to the latest available data, in 2016 there were 7,277,000 police-reported
motor vehicle traffic crashes.26 Over 3.1 million people were injured and
37,461 people were killed in those crashes.27 The number of traffic accidents
are predicted to decline with the use of autonomous vehicles,28 resulting in
fewer injuries and fatalities.29
Almost one-third of traffic crash fatalities involve alcohol-impaired
drivers.30 In 2017 alone, there were 10,874 fatalities caused by alcoholimpaired driving.31 Some advocates stress that autonomous vehicles could
end the problem of drunk driving by removing human drivers from the
vehicle’s control.32 Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for instance,

24
See Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 1615 (discussing expected traffic safety benefits of autonomous
vehicles).
25
Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving
Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 137–38 (2016); Jay L. Zagorsky, Cops May Feel Biggest Impact from
Driverless Car Revolution, CONVERSATION (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:39 AM), https://theconversation.com/copsmay-feel-biggest-impact-from-driverless-car-revolution-38767 [https://perma.cc/JZU7-P24R].
26
NHTSA’S NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
POLICE-REPORTED
MOTOR
VEHICLE
TRAFFIC
CRASHES
IN
2016
1
(2018),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812501 [https://perma.cc/XJJ3-DHX8].
27
Id.
28
Zagorsky, supra note 25.
29
Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 1611.
30
NHTSA’S NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED
DRIVING:
2017
DATA
1
(2018),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812630
[https://perma.cc/J9EJ-LNPJ].
“Alcohol-impaired” means that a driver’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 g/dL or above. Id.
31
Id.
32
See, e.g., Katherine L. Hanna, Comment, Old Laws, New Tricks: Drunk Driving and Autonomous
Vehicles, 55 JURIMETRICS 275, 276 (2015); Ryan Gallagher, Drinking & Riding? DUIs in the Age of SelfDriving Cars, DMV.ORG (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.dmv.org/articles/alcohol-and-self-driving-cars
[https://perma.cc/BW5P-W5DQ].
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recently released a statement emphasizing that autonomous vehicles “hold
incredible potential to completely eliminate drunk driving.”33
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
estimates that human error causes approximately 94% of serious traffic
accidents.34 Common errors include distraction, sleep deprivation, and
intoxication.35 Early testing indicates that autonomous vehicles will
drastically reduce these errors by largely removing human drivers from the
vehicles’ operation.36
For instance, in 2009, Google started its self-driving car project, which
has since developed into an autonomous car development company called
Waymo.37 Since testing started in 2009, Waymo’s vehicles have clocked
more than 10 million miles on routes frequented by pedestrians without
being involved in one fatal accident.38 Waymo has reported approximately
three dozen non-fatal accidents since testing began.39 Notably, the company
attributes these accidents primarily to human error and not the autonomous
vehicles.40 In 2017, Waymo announced that it began testing autonomous cars

33
MADD Statement on Autonomous Vehicle Technology, MADD (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.madd.org/press-release/madd-statement-autonomous-vehicle-technology
[https://perma.cc/B72A-VMEQ].
34
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL
YEAR 2018 1 (2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/fy2018-nhtsa_cj05162017-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EKV-RZ6B].
35
Surden & Williams, supra note 25, at 128.
36
Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety
[https://perma.cc/R78PF3YX] (discussing benefits of autonomous vehicles).
37
Our Journey, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/journey [https://perma.cc/6AL9-27TJ].
38
Kirsten Korosec, Waymo’s Self-Driving Cars Hit 10 Million Miles, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/10/waymos-self-driving-cars-hit-10-million-miles
[https://perma.cc/4QKP-3K5R]; Race to Robot Cars Continues After Fatal Crash, YAHOO! (Mar. 28,
2018),
https://sports.yahoo.com/race-robot-cars-continues-fatal-crash-080430856.html
[https://perma.cc/4KNF-GPXG] (quoting Waymo’s CEO John Krafcik).
39
Currently, California is the only state that requires autonomous vehicle developers to submit
collision reports. Jack Stewart, Why People Keep Rear-Ending Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2018,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-car-crashes-rear-endings-why-charts-statistics
[https://perma.cc/P7F9-ZSW7]. As of June 2019, Waymo has filed nine collision reports for 2019.
Waymo filed twenty-five collision reports for 2018, one report for 2017, and zero reports for 2016. Report
of Traffic Collision Involving an Autonomous Vehicle (OL 316), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES,
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/autonomousveh_ol316
[https://perma.cc/QM85-48YR]. Between 2009 and 2015, Waymo reported sixteen crashes. Matt Richtel
& Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run into Problem: Cars with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/technology/personaltech/google-says-its-not-thedriverless-cars-fault-its-other-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/8BCR-Z2VP].
40
Richtel & Dougherty, supra note 39.
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without a safety driver in the driver’s seat,41 bringing us one step closer to
fully autonomous vehicles.
These expected traffic safety benefits of autonomous vehicles are
directly relevant to law enforcement. FBI statistics show that vehicle-related
accidents account for most accidental law enforcement officer deaths.42 In
2017, forty-seven officers were accidentally killed in the line of duty—
thirty-five of whom were involved in motor vehicle crashes and six of whom
were pedestrian officers struck by vehicles.43 The number of officers who
suffer non-fatal injuries during traffic accidents each year is much greater.44
In addition, a major part of police work today involves traffic
enforcement, including responding to and investigating traffic accidents.45
Each year, law enforcement officers issue tens of millions of traffic
citations.46 With autonomous vehicles being programmed to follow the rules
of the road, researchers stress that autonomous vehicles will reduce the need
for law enforcement to spend vast human and financial resources on
enforcing traffic laws.47
B. Criminal Law Enforcement
Another key issue is whether the new technology will undermine
policing by significantly reducing or eliminating traffic stops, especially

41
Andrew Krok, Waymo Ditches Safety Drive Self-Driving Public Pilot, CNET (Nov. 7, 2017, 8:00
AM), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/waymo-ditches-safety-driver-in-self-driving-public-pilot
[https://perma.cc/UFA4-2RZ5].
42
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Are Most Job-Related Deaths of Police Caused by Traffic Incidents?,
WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/07/12/aremost-job-related-deaths-of-police-caused-by-traffic-incidents/?utm_term=.91b2a4bcc8a0
[https://perma.cc/AGJ4-Q5MS].
43
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2017: LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED tbl.65 (Type of Accident and Activity of Victim
Officer at Time of Incident, 2013–2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2017/tables/table-65.xls
[https://perma.cc/E46U-QNWF].
44
See generally Tom LaTourrette, Risk Factors for Injury in Law Enforcement Officer Vehicle
Crashes, 38 POLICING: INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 478, 478 (2015) (studying risks police
officers face from traffic accidents on the job).
45
CORDNER, supra note 8, at 28.
46
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2016 DATA 16 (2018),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/National-Overview2016/SCCD_2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/HX9H-CZZB] (reporting that the total incoming traffic
violations/caseloads reported by state courts between 2007 and 2016 ranged from 44.9 million to 56.3
million cases per year; COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 31 (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx
[https://perma.cc/3CF7-ATB5].
47
Zagorsky, supra note 25.
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pretextual ones.48 Pretextual traffic stops enable officers to use a traffic
violation as a justification to pull over vehicles when their true motivations
are to investigate unrelated crimes.49 If autonomous vehicles are programmed
to follow traffic rules, then there will be much fewer traffic violations for
officers to use as pretexts for vehicle stops, which could improve citizen and
officer safety alike.50
Some commentators stress that communities of color could benefit in
major ways if autonomous vehicles end or significantly curb pretextual
traffic stops.51 Pretextual traffic stops are a pervasive and institutionalized
law enforcement practice today.52 A long line of legal scholarship criticizes
pretextual traffic stops for enabling racial profiling on roads and highways,
and increasing opportunities for law enforcement to question, seize, search,
and apply force to minority drivers and passengers.53 Studies show that
people of color bear the brunt of intrusive police conduct and its attendant
harms during pretextual traffic stops.54
Some law enforcement leaders, however, have advanced two
counterarguments that relate to the role of traffic stops as a crime-fighting
tool.55 First, they argue that if autonomous vehicles eliminate or significantly

48

Dan Fink, Autonomous Cars: Driving on Auto Pilot, POLICE MAG. (June 22, 2014),
http://www.policemag.com/channel/vehicles/articles/2014/06/autonomous-cars-driving-on-autopilot.aspx [https://perma.cc/8B9D-JSUT].
49
Carbado, supra note 11, at 130; Joh, Discretionless Policing, supra note 10, at 209; L. Song
Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and the Perpetrator Perspective: A Response to Reasonable but
Unconstitutional, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1014 (2015).
50
Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—Oh My! First Generation
Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 663 (2015) [hereinafter
Glancy, Autonomous and Automated]; Washington, supra note 6.
51
Martine Powers, Could Self-Driving Cars Be One Solution to Police Shootings During Traffic
Stops?,
WASH.
POST
(July
12,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgridlock/wp/2016/07/12/could-self-driving-cars-be-one-solution-to-police-shootings-during-trafficstops/?utm_term=.2b1bbd1498a9 [https://perma.cc/V3RH-UBDJ].
52
Carbado, supra note 11, at 155–56 (noting how law enforcement agencies are “very much aware
of the on-the-ground implications of Whren”). In Whren v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the idea that pretextual traffic stops violate the Fourth Amendment. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
53
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002);
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Samuel R. Gross &
Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 651 (2002); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
54
See Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting Young Men of Color for Search and Arrest During
Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–2013, 5 POL., GROUPS & IDENTITIES 107 (2017); see
also, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 690
(2018).
55
See, e.g., Ian Adams & Arthur Rizer, Self-Driving Cars Could Change Landscape of Policing,
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UNION-TRIB.
(Dec.
23,
2016,
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reduce traffic stops (especially pretextual ones), then law enforcement will
have much fewer opportunities to detect criminal activity, investigate crime,
and apprehend criminal suspects.56 Second, they claim that traffic stops are
visible reminders to society that the police has a public presence,57 and thus
deter crime.58 In their view, autonomous vehicles would weaken this alleged
deterrent by eliminating or significantly reducing traffic stops.59 One of the
major open questions, however, is what a “traffic stop” might look like and
whether police will continue the practice with autonomous vehicles.60
Scholars are starting to consider how autonomous vehicles could
engender major shifts in policing strategies away from traffic enforcement.
Autonomous vehicles will have the capacity to record various types of data,
including past locations.61 Therefore, as Professor Orin Kerr has
hypothesized, autonomous vehicles could give rise to greater law
enforcement reliance on car trips to reconstruct past events during criminal
investigations.62 With this potential, scholars and commentators warn that
autonomous vehicles could facilitate government surveillance in ways that
create new forms of discrimination and privacy abuse.63 In this regard,
autonomous vehicles could become a new site of big data policing.64
Scholars and law enforcement leaders have also started exploring how
autonomous vehicles could create new criminal enforcement problems.65 For
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-autonomous-vehicles-policing-traffic20161223-story.html [https://perma.cc/U43L-RSAU].
56
Davis, supra note 3.
57
Zagorsky, supra note 25.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Joh, Automated Seizures, supra note 5 (discussing what traffic stops might look like when officers
stop autonomous vehicles).
61
Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1196 (2012)
[hereinafter Glancy, Privacy] (discussing implications of this recorded data).
62
Orin Kerr, Opinion, How Self-Driving Cars Could Determine the Future of Policing, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
16,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/16/how-self-driving-cars-could-determine-the-future-ofpolicing/?utm_term=.376af6e02653 [https://perma.cc/NF3G-PAHN].
63
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE/STRATEGIC ISSUES GROUP, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
AUTONOMOUS CARS PRESENT GAME CHANGING OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 2 (2014) [hereinafter FBI REPORT]; Lindsey Barrett, Note, Herbie Fully Downloaded:
Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile Exception, 106 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2017); Chasel Lee, Note,
Grabbing the Wheel Early: Moving Forward on Cybersecurity and Privacy Protections for Driverless
Cars, 69 FED. COMM. L.J. 25, 38–39 (2017).
64
See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 1–6 (2017) (describing big data policing).
65
ROBERT FINKELSTEIN & ROB DAVIS, POLICE FOUNDATION, AUTONOMOUS CARS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT
6,
(2017),
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instance, criminals might use unoccupied autonomous vehicles to
anonymously transport illegal drugs or weapons.66 Or terrorists might use
unoccupied autonomous vehicles to drive explosives or chemical weapons
into public spaces and buildings.67 Self-driving cars might also bring changes
to the underground commercial sex industry by providing new spaces for
people to buy and sell sex.68
Cybersecurity is another related issue. Experts stress that smart
criminals could hack and use autonomous vehicles to execute their criminal
plans.69 For instance, they might hijack the control systems of autonomous
vehicles to exceed speed limits and evade the police.70 Other experts,
however, stress that autonomous vehicles may not be as vulnerable to
hacking in the future, especially as industry collaborations and cybersecurity
features improve with the progression of the technology.71
***
In sum, there is growing consensus among stakeholders that
autonomous vehicles have considerable benefits for traffic safety. Some law
enforcement leaders, however, are concerned that these benefits will come
at the cost of impairing police work by making crime detection and criminal
investigations more difficult. Important for the purposes of this Essay, de-

aw%20Enforcement%202%20March%2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NJZ-8NFS]
(noting
that
“[a]utonomous vehicles will make possible new kinds of crimes and criminals”).
66
FBI REPORT, supra note 63, at 1 (describing that autonomous vehicles “open up greater
possibilities . . . for a car to be more of a potential lethal weapon than it is today”); Davis, supra note 3;
Joseph J. Kolb, Will Autonomous Vehicles Improve Highway Safety?, 1 POLICEONE DIG. EDITION, Spring
2018,
at
8,
11,
https://publications.policeone.com/2018/P1_DigitalEdition_HighwaySafety_
Spring2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ3X-RSKL].
67
James Black, Commentary, Autonomous Vehicles: Terrorist Threat or Security Opportunity?,
RAND CORP. BLOG (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/autonomous-vehicles-terroristthreat-or-security-opportunity.html [https://perma.cc/VCD2-L8HZ]. Stakeholders are already
considering potential solutions to terrorist threats from unoccupied autonomous vehicles. For instance, a
patent application was recently filed for a built-in detection system that could detect the presence of
hazardous materials in autonomous vehicles and disable the autonomous features of the vehicles when
potential weapons of mass destruction are detected. U.S. Patent App. No. 14/521866, (filed Oct. 23,
2014).
68
Danielle Paquette, People Are Going to Sell Sex in Driverless Cars, Researchers Say, WASH. POST
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/people-are-going-sell-sexdriverless-cars/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8bcb876fe3ae [https://perma.cc/Y683-C2CD].
69
See, e.g., Rob Toews, The Biggest Threat Facing Connected Autonomous Vehicles Is
Cybersecurity, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 25, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/25/the-biggest-threatfacing-connected-autonomous-vehicles-is-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/YXK2-9CA8].
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FINKELSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 65, at 6.
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See, e.g., Alex Hern, Assume Self-Driving Cars Are a Hacker’s Dream? Think Again, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 30, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/30/self-driving-carshackers-security [https://perma.cc/E5AF-JAHM]; AUTOMOTIVE INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR.,
https://www.automotiveisac.com [https://perma.cc/K2QG-8Y5B].
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escalation and officer safety are not a focus of these discussions on
autonomous vehicles and policing.
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND POLICE DE-ESCALATION
This Part examines five ways that autonomous vehicles and their
included technologies (for instance, sensory technology, real-time HD
mapping, and vehicle connectivity systems) have promise to reduce
possibilities for escalation during motor vehicle stops: (1) vehicles will be
programmed to follow traffic rules, making traffic stops much less common;
(2) sensory technology will prevent vehicles from hitting other vehicles or
persons, decreasing motor vehicle assaults against officers; (3) driver’s
license requirements could be eliminated, taking the enforcement of driver’s
license laws out of the hands of police; (4) DUI law reforms could abolish
the need for officers to conduct DUI stops, investigations, or arrests; and (5)
sensory technology in vehicles will reduce investigations associated with hitand-run offenses, and will simplify accident investigations overall.
A. Traffic Stop Occurrences
As society moves towards autonomous vehicles programmed to follow
traffic rules, many moving traffic violations will disappear.72 With fewer
traffic violations, it is expected that traffic stops will significantly decline.73
In turn, there will be fewer traffic stops to escalate into violence.74
At the same time, autonomous vehicles might not eliminate all traffic
violations. Two possible exceptions are registration and equipment
violations (for example, driving with a broken headlight or taillight). For this
reason, it is important to consider other ways that autonomous vehicles could
facilitate police de-escalation besides simply decreasing the volume of traffic
stops.
B. Motor Vehicle Assaults and Fleeing Drivers
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to reduce the dangers officers
face when interacting with fleeing motorists or approaching stopped
vehicles. A key feature of autonomous vehicles is that built-in sensors will
largely prevent collisions with other vehicles or people.75 This will
72

Brian Fung, How Driverless Cars Could Kill the Speeding Ticket — and Rob Your City, WASH.
POST (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/22/how-driverlesscars-could-kill-the-speeding-ticket-and-rob-your-city/?utm_term=.78b911388835
[https://perma.cc/8A7G-TYPQ].
73
Glancy, Autonomous and Automated, supra note 50, at 661–62.
74
Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 560 (2018).
75
Surden & Williams, supra note 25, at 137–38; Zagorsky, supra note 25.
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significantly undermine the ability of motorists to intentionally hit officers
or occupied patrol cars with motor vehicles. In related work, I have shown
that the motor vehicle is a commonly described assault weapon against
officers during traffic stops that escalate into violence against the police.76
Autonomous vehicles prompt related questions about whether
technological features other than anti-collision sensors can de-escalate police
encounters involving fleeing motorists. On this issue, the direction of the
technology is admittedly less clear. Perhaps law enforcement officers will be
empowered to shut off autonomous vehicles at their own discretion.77
Assuming it does not violate the Fourth Amendment,78 this ability could
prevent motorists from fleeing or hitting officers or patrol cars while
attempting to flee.
There has already been some industry pushback, however, against
granting officers this authority. For instance, reports recently surfaced that
U.S. transportation regulators had a closed-door meeting in March 2018
during which they grappled with whether police officers should be
empowered to disable autonomous vehicles during an emergency.79 A thirtynine-page report from the meeting revealed that participants were skeptical
to allow this because of the possibility that hackers or terrorists could exploit
the same features that would allow police to stop autonomous vehicles.80
Even if officers will not be empowered to automatically shut off
autonomous vehicles for legal or political reasons, the direction of the
technology could shape the moments before officers apprehend fleeing
motorists. If autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow legal speed
limits, then officers could simply follow motorists that flee in autonomous
vehicles until the drivers eventually stop, without assuming the risk of being
hit. Or if officers are able gain access to an autonomous vehicle’s GPS data

76
Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and the Motor Vehicle (manuscript on file with
author) [hereinafter, Woods, Motor Vehicle] (discussing how the motor vehicle as a weapon source is
underappreciated in policing data); see also Woods, Traffic Stops, supra note 16, at 673 & n.166
(presenting results from an empirical study on violence against the police during traffic stops showing
that after personal weapons (hands/fists/feet), the motor vehicle was the second most commonly described
weapon used to assault officers during routine traffic stops for only traffic violations, and the most
commonly described weapon used to assault officers during traffic stops that involved criminal
enforcement beyond a traffic violation).
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Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 516, 529 n.77 (2016)
(noting the possibility that police officers would be able to shut off autonomous vehicles).
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See generally Joh, Automated Seizures, supra note 5 (examining the Fourth Amendment
implications of automated traffic stops on autonomous vehicles).
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David Shepardson, U.S. Regulators Grappling with Self-Driving Vehicle Security, REUTERS
(July 10, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving/u-s-regulators-grapplingwith-self-driving-vehicle-security-idUSKBN1K02OD [https://perma.cc/4A4Q-XBZC].
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in real-time, then officers may not need to follow fleeing motorists at all.81
High-speed police pursuits, considered to be an inherently dangerous aspect
of policing,82 could significantly decline, if not disappear.
Technological features in autonomous vehicles may also address officer
safety concerns when they approach stopped vehicles, such as being
assaulted with car doors.83 In 2016, Jaguar Land Rover filed a patent
application for a new system that uses sensors in car door handles and
elsewhere around the car in order to prevent the car doors from denting.84
The sensors work by detecting how close a car is to an obstacle (for instance,
other vehicles, lampposts, pillars, or walls) before calculating how far the car
door can open.85 A mechanism built into the car door then increases
resistance the closer it gets to an object, making it harder to open the car door
quickly and cause damage.86 The system also includes signals, such as
indicator lights, to alert others that a door is about to open.87
These sensory systems could make it more difficult for motorists in
autonomous vehicles to open their doors to intentionally hit officers. If
incorporated into windows, the technology could also make it more difficult
for motorists to intentionally close their windows on officers’ arms and
hands. In addition, the alerts could give officers more time to move out of
the way and avoid these types of assaults.
C. Unlicensed Drivers
Autonomous vehicles could produce radical changes in driver’s license
laws and perhaps make driver’s licenses obsolete.88 The logic is that if human

81
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drivers are not required to take control of autonomous vehicles, then there is
no need to require a driver’s license.89
These reforms are politically feasible.90 In 2017, Georgia enacted
legislation amending the state motor vehicle code to exempt drivers of fully
autonomous vehicles from driver’s license requirements.91 In October 2016,
California released a draft of regulations on autonomous vehicles, which
stated that the most advanced autonomous vehicles would no longer be
required to have a licensed driver if and when federal officials deem them
safe enough.92
In prior work, I discuss that these invocations of police authority are
central to why many traffic stops on unlicensed drivers today escalate into
assaults against officers.93 These driver’s license reforms would eliminate the
authority for officers to initiate traffic stops based on driving with an invalid
license. In addition, an invalid license would no longer be a justification for
officers to order drivers out of cars, detain, or arrest drivers, thus reducing
the potential for escalation into violence.

89
See sources cited supra note 88 and accompanying text. But see Jennifer Bradley, Will You Need
a Driving Licence in the Age of Self-Driving Cars?, BBC (July 31, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40570592 [https://perma.cc/54FH-7S56] (arguing that until cars
are fully autonomous, licensing requirements for self-driving cars should remain for safety reasons).
90
See Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 2 (discussing each state’s autonomous vehicle related bills).
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S.B. 219, 2017 Ga. Laws 549, codified in part at GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21 (West 2017); see also
W. Perry Hicks & Alan J. Ponce, SB 219 – Autonomous Vehicles, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 231, 240–43
(2017) (discussing Georgia’s amendments).
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[https://perma.cc/D55K-LFTN]; see also Justin Pritchard, California Opens Pathway for Cars that Lack
Steering Wheel, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2016, 8:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-californiaopens-pathway-for-cars-that-lack-steering-wheel-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/62CR-Y9PE]. Relatedly, in
October 2018, the California DMV issued its first permit to allow the testing of driverless vehicles. See
State of Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, DMV Issues Permit Authorizing Waymo to Test Driverless Vehicles
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(Oct.
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2018),
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_81 [https://perma.cc/38NC-6T8T].
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Woods, Motor Vehicle, supra note 76 (presenting results from an empirical study on violence
against the police during traffic stops finding that approximately 40% of stops that escalated into nonfatal assaults against officers involved drivers who did not have a valid driver’s license); Woods, Traffic
Stops, supra note 16, at 690 (presenting results from an empirical study on violence against the police
during traffic stops finding that invocations of police authority for not having a valid driver’s license was
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D. Intoxicated Drivers
Every year, there are over one million arrests for driving under the
influence (DUI) in the United States alone.94 If autonomous vehicles can
transport intoxicated occupants without requiring them take control of the
vehicles, then public safety will no longer be a valid justification to ban
operating a vehicle while intoxicated or allow officers to conduct DUI stops,
investigations, or arrests.95
In prior work, I describe that these invocations of police authority are
central to why many traffic stops on intoxicated drivers today escalate into
assaults against officers.96 Each step of the DUI investigation process—from
the initial questioning, to ordering the driver out of the vehicle to conduct the
roadside exercises, to the undertaking of the roadside exercises, to the arrest,
to the transporting of the intoxicated driver to the testing facility, to the
transporting of the intoxicated driver to jail—opens opportunities for the
encounter to escalate into violence against the police (as well as civilians). If
intoxicated drivers no longer pose a public safety threat with autonomous
vehicles, then perhaps the only basis upon which officers can initiate stops
on intoxicated drivers will be to help those in need of assistance.
These reforms have not yet emerged in the United States, and officers
are still arresting drivers for DUI-related offenses when driving semiautonomous cars on autopilot.97 There are calls for these reforms, however,
in the international arena. For instance, in October 2017, the National
Transport Commission of Australia recommended that laws against driving
under the influence no longer apply to occupants in autonomous vehicles
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Woods, Motor Vehicle, supra note 76 (presenting results from an empirical study on violence
against the police during traffic stops finding that approximately 20% of the evaluated stops that escalated
into non-fatal assaults against officers involved drivers who showed signs of intoxication during the stop);
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with high or full automation.98 Accordingly, the extent to which these DUI
law reforms gain support in the United States will likely depend on the level
of automation that self-driving cars achieve.99
E. Hit-and-Run and Accident Investigations
Traffic enforcement also includes responding to and investigating hitand-run offenses and traffic accidents.100 Sensory technology in autonomous
vehicles should reduce hit-and-run incidents and motor vehicle accidents
more generally. In turn, investigations surrounding hit-and-run offenses and
motor vehicle accidents will decline, reducing opportunities for those
investigations to escalate into violence against officers.
***
Autonomous vehicles and their included technologies hold promise to
decrease possibilities for escalation during motor vehicle stops in ways that
benefit officer as well as civilian safety. Illuminating these potential benefits
illustrates the importance of considering officer safety as a vector in the
growing scholarly and policy discourse on autonomous vehicles. These
potential benefits regarding de-escalation, however, also have meaningful
implications for policing laws, policies, and practices. The Essay now shifts
gears to discuss these issues.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DE-ESCALATION
This Part considers the implications of autonomous vehicles’ potential
to decrease possibilities for escalation on Fourth Amendment doctrine,
officer training, and departmental policies.
A. Fourth Amendment
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide a truly comprehensive
analysis of the various ways in which autonomous vehicles will test the
bounds of Fourth Amendment protection. The technology, however, will
challenge engrained assumptions about the dangerousness of motor vehicle
stops to law enforcement officers in existing Fourth Amendment law. To
illustrate this point, this Part focuses on one prime example: officers’ use of
deadly force during motor vehicle stops.101 Several courts, including the U.S.
98
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Supreme Court, have rejected Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force
and upheld officers’ use of deadly force against suspects fleeing in motor
vehicles.102 As explained below, their reasoning commonly turns on the
belief that the vehicles’ drivers posed a reasonable threat to officers and the
public at large.
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris.103 In this
case, a Georgia county deputy tried to pull over a speeding driver.104 The
driver refused to pull over, sped away, and a high-speed chase began. The
deputy radioed to report the pursuit and the driver’s license plate number.
Deputy Scott overheard the report and joined the pursuit with other officers.
During the chase, the driver pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center
and was nearly boxed in by various patrol cars. The driver evaded the trap
by making a sharp turn, collided with Deputy Scott’s patrol car, exited the
parking lot, and sped off again down a two-lane highway. Deputy Scott then
took over as the lead pursuit vehicle and decided to terminate the pursuit by
using a precision immobilization technique (PIT)—which involves making
contact with a fleeing suspect’s car, and when effective, causes a loss of tire
traction and the engine to shut down.105 After receiving permission to execute
the PIT maneuver, Deputy Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of the
driver’s vehicle.106 The driver then lost control of his vehicle, which
overturned and crashed. The driver was badly injured and was rendered a
quadriplegic.
The driver filed a Section 1983 suit alleging that Deputy Scott used
excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.107 The Court, however, held that Deputy Scott did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because his decision to terminate the pursuit by
bumping into the back of the driver’s car was objectively reasonable.108

A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119 (2008); Osagie K. Obasogie &
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In its analysis, the Court first distinguished the case from its prior
decision in Tennessee v. Garner,109 stressing that the threat posed by an
unarmed suspect fleeing by foot is not “even remotely comparable to the
extreme danger to human life” posed by the driver in the case at hand.110 In
balancing the nature of the individual intrusion against the importance of the
relevant governmental interests, the Government pointed to ensuring public
safety, which the Court characterized as “paramount.”111 The Court then
stressed that the driver “posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of
any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and
to the officers involved in the chase.”112 It concluded that Deputy Scott’s
actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the driver
intentionally put himself and the public in danger by refusing to stop during
the high-speed pursuit, whereas the bystanders and officers who were at risk
of harm during the pursuit were entirely innocent.113
More recently, the Court followed the logic in Scott to reach its
unanimous decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard.114 In this case, an Arkansas
police officer pulled over a car for only having one headlight.115 The officer
asked the driver if he had been drinking and the driver responded that he had
not. The driver failed to produce his driver’s license upon request and
appeared nervous. The officer then asked the driver to exit the car. Rather
than comply with the officer’s request, the driver sped away.
The officer chased the driver, and five other officers soon joined the
pursuit on an interstate. The vehicles attained speeds of over 100 miles per
hour and the officers passed more than two dozen other vehicles during the
chase. The driver eventually exited the interstate and made a quick right turn,
which caused his car to make contact with one of the patrol cars. The contact
caused the driver’s car to spin out into a parking lot and collide with another
officer’s police car. In danger of being cornered, the driver put his car into
reverse. The two officers then exited their patrol cars, and one who had a gun
in his hand pounded on the passenger’s window. The driver’s car then made
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contact with another patrol car. The driver’s tires were still spinning after
contact, suggesting that his foot was on the accelerator. One of the officers
then fired three shots into the driver’s car. The driver then reversed the car
and maneuvered onto another street, which forced one of the officers to step
out of the way to avoid the vehicle. As the driver fled down the street, two
other officers fired twelve shots towards the driver’s car. The driver then lost
control of the car and crashed into a building. Both the driver and the
passenger died from some combination of the gunshot wounds and the crash
that ended the chase.
The driver’s surviving daughter brought a Section 1983 suit alleging
that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.116 The Court, however, held that the officers’ conduct did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.117 It reasoned that the driver’s reckless
driving patterns during the chase posed “a grave public safety risk.”118 It
further stressed that at the moment the shots were fired, the driver was intent
on resuming his flight, which would “pose a deadly threat for others on the
road.”119 The Court underscored that “it was beyond serious dispute” that the
driver’s flight posed a public safety risk, and therefore, as in Scott, the
officers acted reasonably to end that risk.120 It further reasoned that the firing
of fifteen shots in total was reasonable because the driver never abandoned
his attempt to flee while the shots were fired.121
Reimagine both U.S Supreme Court cases with autonomous vehicles.
The facts and analysis of Scott and Rickard could look very different.
Starting with Scott, the Georgia county deputy attempted to pull the driver
over for speeding.122 If autonomous vehicles are designed to follow legal
speed limits, then the underlying traffic violation would never have occurred.
The officers then chased the fleeing vehicle, which they nearly boxed in with
various patrol cars.123 The driver evaded the trap by colliding with Deputy
Scott’s patrol car. If sensory technology prevents vehicles from colliding
with other vehicles or persons, then the driver would not have been able to
hit Deputy Scott’s patrol car. In addition, if the driver’s vehicle would have
automatically shut down after it was boxed in by various patrol cars, then the
officers could have apprehended the driver without using such force.
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Deputy Scott then terminated the pursuit by hitting the rear of the
driver’s vehicle.124 The Court upheld Deputy Scott’s use of deadly force by
stressing that the driver posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of
other motorists, the officers involved in the chase, and pedestrians.125 If
sensory technology prevents vehicles from colliding with other vehicles or
persons, then this assumption no longer holds. Thus, if the car in Scott was
an autonomous vehicle, not only would the pursuit, the collision, and the use
of deadly force likely not have occurred to begin with, but even if the events
unfolded the same way, the Court would not have been able to rely on the
same assumptions.
Now reimagine the facts in Rickard. In Rickard, the officer pulled over
a vehicle for only having one headlight.126 Unlike moving violations,
equipment violations may still exist when autonomous vehicles are the
norm.127 The driver failed to produce his driver’s license, refused the officer’s
order to exit the car, appeared nervous, and drove away.128 Driver’s licenses
may be a relic of the past if autonomous vehicles do not require drivers to
take control of the vehicles.129 As a result, the officer might never have
ordered the driver out of the car and the driver might not have gotten nervous
or fled for not having a valid driver’s license.
A high-speed pursuit then ensued, with the patrol and driver’s vehicles
reaching speeds of over 100 miles per hour.130 If autonomous vehicles are
programmed to follow legal speed limits, then the driver’s vehicle would not
have been able to attain such high speeds. The driver then made a quick right
turn, which caused his car to spin out of control in a parking lot and collide
with another officer’s police car. Sensory technology in the vehicle could
have prevented this impact. The officers then exited their patrol car,
approached the driver’s car, and the driver drove into another patrol car and
appeared to keep his foot on the accelerator. Sensory technology could have
also prevented this second contact and neutralized any threat the driver posed
by keeping his foot on the accelerator. The driver then reversed the car and
maneuvered his car onto another street, which forced another officer to step
out of the way to avoid being hit. Sensory technology could have also
neutralized any threat that the officer would have been hit.
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It is at this time that the officers fired twelve shots towards the driver’s
car.131 In upholding the officers’ use of deadly force, the Court specifically
emphasized that the driver’s reckless driving posed “a grave public safety
risk.”132 It further stressed that this risk was “beyond serious dispute.”133
Reimagining the facts of the case with a fully autonomous vehicle suggests
that the chase would not have unfolded as it did, the officers would not have
fired the twelve shots, and that the Court would not have ruled that the
driving posed a safety risk.
A skeptical reader could argue that the Court may move in the opposite
direction and declare that any stop on an autonomous vehicle is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, autonomous vehicles could
give rise to mass automated traffic stops that open new possibilities for the
Court to rethink the bounds of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in traffic
stop contexts.134 Although these legal questions regarding the inception of
traffic stops on autonomous vehicles are open to debate, the analysis above
regarding the potential for the technology to reduce escalation prompts novel
questions about the legitimacy of upholding invocations of police authority
(for instance, use of force) during stops on autonomous vehicles based on
officer safety grounds. Put another way, as the dangers that motor vehicles
pose to officers during police encounters shift with autonomous vehicles, so
must Fourth Amendment law that upholds police conduct during traffic stops
based on these danger assumptions.
B. Law Enforcement Policies and Officer Training
This Section discusses how autonomous vehicles’ potential to reduce
possibilities for police escalation will challenge the underlying logic of
standard departmental policies and common approaches to officer training
on motor vehicle stops. Shifts in officer training are already unfolding in
some jurisdictions. In 2017, Waymo (the company now leading Google’s
self-driving car project) started collaborating with law enforcement agencies
in Arizona, California, Texas, and Washington to educate agencies on how
to identify and access autonomous vehicles for the purpose of accident
investigations.135 These training initiatives, however, have yet to touch on
traffic or criminal enforcement stops.
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1. Pretextual Traffic Stops
It is especially important to consider how autonomous vehicles could
affect departmental policies and practices surrounding pretext stops given
that the technology could have very significant consequences for society’s
most marginalized and over-policed communities. On one hand, there will
be a transition period during which both autonomous and conventional
vehicles share the road. Turning a blind eye towards policing issues could
enable autonomous vehicles to become a new proxy to separate low-income
and wealthier civilians,136 and thus exacerbate pretextual stops against
society’s most marginalized groups based on race and class.
On the other hand, the rise of autonomous vehicles could create new
space to reconsider law enforcement policies and practices involving
pretextual traffic stops. If autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow
traffic rules then there will be much fewer traffic violations for officers to
use as pretexts for vehicle stops.137 With this shift in traffic, law enforcement
agencies could prohibit officers from conducting pretextual traffic stops in
general, or on drivers who have access to the technology (which should
increase as self-driving cars become more commonplace). In this regard, the
spread of autonomous vehicles might force police practices on pretextual
traffic stops to change even if the law on pretextual traffic stops does not.
Some law enforcement leaders, however, are advancing concerns that
eliminating traffic stops will decrease opportunities for police to discover
evidence of crime.138 They further claim that traffic stops are visible
reminders to society that the police has a public presence, and thus
autonomous vehicles will eliminate a deterrent to crime. The analysis in the
previous Part, however, illustrates that this critique misses a critical
component of the cost-benefit analysis on autonomous vehicles and
policing—namely, officer safety.139
If autonomous vehicles pressure law enforcement agencies to stop
conducting pretextual traffic stops, then officers will need to justify vehicle
stops for unrelated crime based on independent, requisite suspicion.
Departmental policies on pretextual traffic stops, however, do not always
require officers to have this independent suspicion. Rather, many policies
simply internalize the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United
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States, which upheld pretextual traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment
so long as officers have probable cause of a traffic violation.140
Consider the policy from a law enforcement agency in Tampa,
Florida.141 The policy includes a firm statement against using “race, ethnic
origin, gender, age, economic status, or sexual orientation of an individual”
as an independent factor or reason for initiating a traffic stop and other
enforcement efforts.142 The policy also includes a statement that traffic stops
“should be based on a standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause as
required by the Fourth Amendment.”143 It further states that officers must
base a traffic stop on “reasonable and articulable facts. These facts, when
viewed through the eyes of a trained and experienced law enforcement
officer must be sufficient to cause him/her to believe that criminal activity
or civil violations have occurred, or are about to occur, without regard” for
the identity characteristics listed above.144 Yet critically, the policy does not
mandate a higher evidentiary bar that prohibits officers from conducting
pretextual traffic stops for the purpose of investigating unrelated crimes.
In allowing officers to initiate pretextual traffic stops without adequate
information about an unrelated crime, pretextual traffic stops distort and
obfuscate the true dangers of vehicle stops in ways that undermine both
officer and civilian safety.145 Accordingly, autonomous vehicles could
encourage departmental polices and police practices that require officers to
gather more information about suspected non-traffic crime during vehicle
encounters than they might gather in today’s driving regime when pretextual
traffic stops are a fast and reliable tool at their disposal. Better information
could enhance officers’ ability to accurately evaluate the risks of danger
during the stops they conduct on autonomous vehicles and thus enhance
officer safety and standards of criminal investigations.146
2. High-Speed Pursuits and Immobilization Techniques
Autonomous vehicles will also challenge the logic of departmental
policies and officer training on high-speed pursuits. Some researchers have
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gone so far as to argue that “the car chase will be a thing of the past” when
autonomous vehicles are the norm.147
Calls for law enforcement agencies to adopt policy restrictions on highspeed vehicle chases go back decades148 and persist today.149 Geoffrey
Alpert’s groundbreaking research in the 1980s called attention to the fact that
most high-speed vehicle pursuits result from an observed traffic violation,
not a serious crime.150 In 1990, the U.S. Department of Justice described
these pursuits as “the most dangerous of all ordinary police activities.”151
Since then, many law enforcement agencies have adopted policies that
restrict when officers can engage in high-speed vehicle pursuits.152
To illustrate how autonomous vehicles and related vehicle technologies
might affect pursuit policies, consider the following example from the
Florida Highway Patrol (FHP).153 The FHP pursuit policy begins by stressing
that its purpose is to balance the benefits of potentially apprehending
suspects with the risks associated with the pursuit, and stresses that vehicular
pursuits of fleeing suspects “present a danger to the public, officers and
suspects involved in the pursuit.”154 The policy then states that officers are
only authorized to initiate pursuits of suspects whom they reasonably believe
have committed a felony, reckless driving, or DUI.155 It authorizes officers
to exceed “maximum speed limits so long as life or property is not
endangered.”156 When deciding whether to initiate or continue a pursuit, the
policy directs officers to weigh several factors including: “[t]he seriousness
147
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of the violator’s original offense”; “the immediate threat to the safety of law
enforcement or the public”; “[t]he likelihood of apprehension”; “the time,
day, and location of the pursuit”; “weather and roadway condition[s]”;
“[p]resence and volume of other vehicular or pedestrian traffic”;
“[f]amiliarity with the roadways and the area”; pursuit speeds; and evasive
tactics by the violator.157 In addition, the policy authorizes officers to deploy
pursuit termination devices (PTDs) when a driver refuses to stop158 as well
as use precision immobilization techniques (PITs) to terminate the pursuit.159
The extent to which this pursuit policy aligns with the nature of driving
with autonomous vehicles is questionable. If vehicles are programmed to
follow traffic rules and sensory technology prevents impact with other
vehicles and persons, then fleeing vehicle suspects may not present as great
of a danger to the public or law enforcement as they do today. The basis upon
which officers are authorized to initiate pursuits may also shift. For instance,
the policy above authorizes vehicle pursuits on DUI suspects, but DUI laws
could shift if autonomous vehicles can safely transport intoxicated occupants
without requiring them to take control of the vehicle.160
The factors that the policy directs officers to weigh before initiating or
continuing pursuits may also become irrelevant. If it is possible to track
autonomous vehicles while they are moving,161 then it might be much more
difficult for violators to evade the police, which increases the likelihood of
their apprehension. Or, if autonomous vehicles are programmed to follow
traffic rules and include effective anti-collision sensors, then the time, day,
or location of the pursuit; pursuit speeds; weather and roadway conditions;
and the presence and volume of other vehicular traffic become irrelevant.
Relatedly, autonomous vehicles may also call policies surrounding PIT
maneuvers into question. Researchers and law enforcement leaders have
characterized PIT maneuvers as an extremely dangerous tactic.162 If sensors
built into autonomous vehicles prevent contact with other vehicles, then
merely boxing in a fleeing autonomous vehicle could be sufficient to stop it
without requiring officers to assume the risk of ramming patrol cars into the
vehicle. Alternatively, researchers are already testing the possibility of using
unoccupied autonomous police cars to conduct PIT maneuvers on fleeing
157
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vehicles, removing the dangers of conducting PIT maneuvers to law
enforcement officers entirely.163 Or, if officers can legally override the
control system of an autonomous vehicle on their own or by communicating
with a third party agent,164 then officers would no longer have to use PIT
maneuvers to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, the technology could open a
need to revamp departmental policies surrounding PIT maneuvers and may
even render these policies obsolete.
3. The Use of Violent Examples of Traffic Stops in Officer Training
Today, police academies regularly show officer trainees videos of the
most extreme cases of violence during traffic stops in order to stress that
everyday police work can quickly turn deadly if the officers become
complacent on the scene and hesitate to use force.165 These extreme cases
usually involve officers who are unexpectedly shot during traffic stops that
at first seemed entirely unremarkable and routine.166
In previous work, I have argued that the very low proportion of violence
involving the use of guns or knives against officers during routine traffic
stops calls into question the use of these violent examples during officer
training.167 If autonomous vehicles can be programed to follow traffic rules
and routine traffic enforcement no longer has the same place in police work
as it does now, then the reasons for using these extreme cases during officer
training become even more dubious.
Importantly, danger narratives surrounding traffic stops often focus on
the moment the officer approaches the stopped vehicle.168 Consistent with
this idea, many law enforcement agencies have departmental policies
surrounding traffic stops that include specific guidance on approaching the
vehicle. Consider an example from Florida’s highway patrol department.169
The guidance begins by stressing that “[a]pproach to the vehicle should be
made in a manner that affords the member maximum protection.”170 It then
163
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offers guidance on how officers should approach the vehicle, where the
officers should stand, what officers should say to the drivers and passengers
when standing next to the stopped vehicle, and how to obtain necessary
documents from the vehicle occupants to complete the stop.171
Consider how this policy applies to autonomous vehicles. Sensory
technology will make it much more difficult for drivers to use their cars to
intentionally hit officers who approach.172 In addition, sensory technology
could prevent officers from being struck by oncoming traffic while
approaching stopped vehicles. These advancements could reduce fears and
anxieties surrounding the motor vehicle as a source of danger to officers
during traffic stops, which shape officer training and best practices today on
how officers should approach stopped vehicles.173
In fact, officers may not even need to approach stopped vehicles in
order to complete traffic stops if autonomous police cars become the norm.174
For instance, in January 2018, Ford filed a patent application for an
autonomous police car, which could remotely issue traffic citations and
pursue vehicles without face-to-face interaction between officers and
stopped motorists.175 The autonomous police car could wirelessly connect to
the stopped car and communicate with the driver, verify the identity of the
driver, and issue a citation.176 It could also pursue a fleeing vehicle, track its
location, and capture photos and video that could later be used as evidence.177
The autonomous police car would be able to keep a record of what transpired
during an encounter and wirelessly transmit that record to relevant
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government agencies.178 Ford’s patent application states that the autonomous
police car could perform tasks with or without human officers inside the
vehicle.179
Imagine if police agencies deployed autonomous police cars like the
one described in Ford’s patent application. Any communication between an
officer and a stopped driver could occur through wireless communications
between the autonomous police car and the stopped autonomous vehicle.180
The autonomous police car would be able to identify traffic violators, receive
images of required documents (including driver’s licenses to the extent that
they are still required), and tell stopped occupants through vehicle-to-vehicle
communication when they are free to leave.181 Thus, autonomous vehicles
will neutralize dangers at the moment officers approach a stopped vehicle—
the most dangerous moment, as portrayed in officer training. This may result
in less extreme examples of violence used in training, potentially leading to
police officers generally feeling safer on patrol, and a decrease in escalated
situations.
CONCLUSION
The research in this Essay helps to fill the gap in the scholarly and
policy discourse on autonomous vehicles and policing by introducing deescalation and officer safety as a new vector in the conversation. Of course,
there are many open questions about the direction of autonomous vehicles
and the various legal dilemmas that the technology could pose. Nevertheless,
policymakers and scholars must consider how autonomous vehicles will
affect police work so that the technology can develop in ways that mutually
benefit officers and civilians during police encounters. This Essay illustrates
the need to explore and embrace the potential of autonomous vehicles as
tools of police de-escalation to enhance both officer and civilian safety
during police encounters.
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